Russia’s 2014 Expulsion and the G7’s Legitimacy Crisis
When Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, the G8 immediately reverted to the G7 format—expelling Moscow for violating the group’s foundational norms of sovereignty and international law. This split underscored that Russia “never shared the G7’s democratic or economic values,” as NATO analysts had warned even before 2014, and it shattered the G8 experiment designed to integrate post‑Soviet Russia into Western institutions and reduced G7 as -ineffective American allies ceremony.
The Representation Crisis
- Economic Obsolescence:
In the 1980s, the G7 accounted for over 60 percent of global nominal GDP. By 2025, its seven members—United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada—together produce roughly about 45 percent. Meanwhile, China alone contributes nearly 17 percent of global output. - Political Exclusion:
The G7 has no seat for India or Brazil—two of the world’s largest democracies and key players in climate negotiations and development finance. India’s vast economy and market ranks fourth globally, yet it remains on the sidelines of G7 decision‑making. - Strategic Blind Spots:
Without China or India at the table, the G7 struggles to forge binding agreements on climate finance, debt relief for low‑income countries, and supply‑chain resilience—areas where Global South consensus is essential.
The Execution Deficit
- Climate Hypocrisy:
Despite a 2009 pledge to phase out “inefficient” fossil‑fuel subsidies by 2025, G7 governments collectively still support those fuels to the tune of USD 282 billion in 2023—nearly triple the level of 2020. - Trade Self‑Sabotage:
Although recent G7 statements reaffirm free‑trade principles, member states have concurrently pursued unilateral measures—such as domestic “national security” tariffs and export‑control regimes—that undermine the WTO’s rules‑based order.
Niche Utility in a Multipolar World
- Crisis Coordination:
The G7 still rapidly aligns on sanctions and arms pledges, acting as a pre‑NATO caucus when traditional institutions lag. - Norm‑Setting:
Initiatives like the FATF’s crackdown on illicit finance and the extraordinary‑revenue loans for Ukraine show the G7 can catalyze policy innovations that later diffuse to larger forums. - Speed and Confidentiality:
With only seven members (plus the EU), back‑channel negotiations on emerging issues—cybersecurity, AI governance—can move faster than in the G20’s 20+ participants.
Not adapting
- Geopolitical Irrelevance:
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the G20—now including China, India, and Brazil—has emerged as the premier forum for global economic coordination. - Internal Fractures:
Divergent threat perceptions (e.g., U.S. focus on China vs. European wariness of Russia) and domestic political swings erode the G7’s capacity for unified action. - Legitimacy Trap:
Inviting emerging powers would dilute Western control; yet persisting with a small, Western‑centric club makes its resolutions easy to dismiss as insider declarations.
A Ceremonial Sunset
At the June 2025 Kananaskis summit, host Canada abandoned the traditional joint communiqué—opting instead for a chair’s summary—marking the first time since the early 1980s that G7 leaders did not issue a collective declaration. This symbolic retreat underscores the G7’s narrowing mandate: once a global steering committee, now a homogeneous talking shop of like‑minded democracies. Unless it transforms into a genuine stepping stone toward inclusive G20 action, the G7 risks drifting into obsolescence—and ending as a relic of Western dominance rather than an engine for solving twenty‑first‑century challenges.