Afghanistan: A Graveyard of Empires

For millennia Afghanistan’s rugged lands have beaten back would-be conquerors. The country even earned the nickname “the graveyard of empires” after powers as varied as the British, the Soviet Union and the United States failed to hold it. But older invaders fared no better. The Persian emperor Cyrus the Great twice invaded the region, only to die there in 530 B.C. fighting local tribes (Herodotus called it “the most violent of all battles ever fought by barbarians”). Alexander the Great conquered the old Persian satrapies in Afghanistan, but discovered that the land was “mountainous and scarred by deserts” and that its people waged relentless guerrilla resistance. Even Genghis Khan’s Mongols — who slaughtered cities like Balkh and Herat in 1221 — were later ambushed in the Hindu Kush. Afghan fighters at Parwan broke the Mongol army in a two-day battle, inflicting what would be the Mongols’ only defeat in decades.

British, Soviet and American Quagmires

The 19th-century British Empire tried to use Afghanistan as a buffer to protect India, but paid a brutal price. In the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), a retreating British column of about 16,000 (soldiers and camp followers) was almost wiped out in a winter blizzard during its withdrawal from Kabul. A few years later the British invaded again, recovering ground, but ultimately the cost convinced them to keep only a light influence. By 1919 the Third Anglo-Afghan War left Afghanistan largely independent rather than a British colony.

In 1979 the Soviet Union sent in a large army to prop up a communist government. The Red Army held Kabul and major towns but never pacified the countryside. Afghan mujahideen waged hit-and-run attacks across the mountains, and even Soviet helicopters and armoured convoys became vulnerable to ambush. The campaign turned into a costly quagmire: the Soviets suffered roughly 15,000 dead and tens of thousands wounded, and withdrew in 1989 without stabilizing the country.

The U.S.-led effort (2001–2021) repeated the pattern. American and NATO forces toppled the Taliban government within months, but then fought a two-decade insurgency. Over 2,400 U.S. troops were killed (and many more wounded), plus tens of thousands of Afghan soldiers and civilians. The U.S. poured over $2.3 trillion into the war efforts, yet when U.S. forces finally withdrew in 2021, the Taliban quickly returned to power. Each of these modern powers achieved short-term gains, but none could build a stable Afghan state on the cheap.

Key Challenges: Mountains, Tribes, Guerrillas and Cost

Observers point to recurring factors behind these failures. Afghanistan’s geography is brutally unforgiving: the Hindu Kush mountains, wide deserts and harsh winters give defenders shelter and make it nearly impossible for outsiders to deploy large armies and supplies. The population’s social fabric is strongly local and tribal. Loyalties run to family and clan rather than a central government, so invaders find themselves negotiating with dozens of independent warlords instead of one ruler. Guerrilla warfare plays to these strengths: Afghan fighters (Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and others) know the terrain intimately. They melt into mountain villages or caves after ambushing convoys, forcing foreign armies into a grinding war of attrition. Finally, the cost-versus-reward calculus discourages enduring occupation. Afghanistan has few obvious riches – its minerals and opium trade are far outweighed by the toll of war. Empires inevitably find themselves investing massive blood and treasure for little strategic gain.

• Rugged terrain: Mountains, narrow passes and wild weather enable hit-and-run attacks and stall mechanized armies.
• Tribal society: With no strong national identity, Afghans resist outsiders fiercely. Local clans often unite only to drive away invaders.
• Guerrilla tactics: Insurgents use caves, villages and knowledge of the landscape to ambush and disappear.
• Poor payoff: Aside from a few minerals and trade routes, Afghanistan offers little wealth — not enough to justify the staggering human and financial cost suffered by occupiers.

China’s Economic Diplomacy (No Boots)

In recent years China has pursued a very different strategy. Beijing holds no troops in Afghanistan; instead it has engaged quietly through trade, investment and diplomacy. China has encouraged its companies to explore Afghan resources (for example negotiating a massive copper mine) and has asked Kabul to join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese diplomats have met Taliban leaders and pledged major trade deals. For instance, two-way trade hit about $1.3 billion in 2023 (a 125% jump), and as of late 2024 China offers Afghan exports 100% duty-free access to its market. Chinese cargo trains now run all the way to Mazar-e-Sharif, linking Afghanistan to China via Central Asia.

Yet even here, Beijing is cautious. China has not formally recognized the Taliban government and remains wary of Afghan instability spilling over into its own western region (Xinjiang). Chinese officials stress that infrastructure and business development – not military force – are their tools. By betting on commerce and diplomacy in Afghanistan, China hopes to gain influence and resources with none of the destruction that defeated earlier empires.

India’s Role in Afghanistan: Ancient Roots to Strategic Engagement

Afghanistan was part of the ancient Indian cultural sphere. Gandhara—now on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border—flourished under Mauryan rule (305 BCE), spreading Buddhism and linking the region closely to historic Indian empires till the british rule over India.
In 21st century, Since 2002, India invested over $3 billion in Afghanistan, executing more than 400 projects across all provinces. Landmark infrastructure includes: Salma Dam (Afghan–India Friendship Dam): a 42 MW hydroelectric and irrigation project completed in 2016, Zaranj–Delaram Highway: a 218 km corridor linking Iran’s Chabahar port to Afghanistan’s Ring Road, Afghan Parliament building and restoration of the Stor Palace in Kabul. India has championed use of Iran’s Chabahar port to bypass Pakistan, supporting trade, aid, and access to Central Asia . Even after the Taliban takeover in 2021, India continued humanitarian efforts—sending wheat, vaccines, medicine, and facilitating Afghan commercial trucks via Attari border .
In January 2025, India’s Foreign Secretary met the Taliban’s Acting Foreign Minister in Dubai—the highest-level engagement since 2021. Discussions covered development cooperation, humanitarian aid, Chabahar logistics, security assurances, and cricket diplomacy. India also established regular contact lines and deployed a technical mission in Kabul.